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Abstract 
 
The present doctoral dissertation aims to offer an indirect defence of the individualist 
position in the debate concerning collective moral responsibility. As such it swims 
against the general tide as it were. However, the individualism defended in the 
dissertation is of a rather weak kind, allowing a range of collective entities. Basically, 
the main claim of the thesis is that only human agents qualify as moral agents, and 
thus moral responsibility, either individual or collective, is to be ascribed to individual 
agents either individually or collectively.  
The dissertation consists of four articles. A major part of my thesis consists of 
critical evaluations of some available versions of the collectivist position with respect 
to collective moral responsibility, the position according to which collectives in their 
own right are, at least in some cases, capable of bearing moral responsibility 
independently of the individual members of the collective.  
My approach in the articles is to argue that collectives in their own right are 
not capable of bearing moral responsibility and thus the collectivist rendering of 
collective moral responsibility is not a viable option. I argue herein that collectives, 
even if acceptable as agents, cannot satisfy conditions of moral responsibility in the 
way that would make it fair to hold collective agents morally responsible in their own 
right. 
The starting point of ‘Collective moral responsibility: A collective as an 
independent moral agent’ is Gilbert’s claim that groups can be morally responsible 
much in the same way as individual persons. This article is an attempt to understand 
what kind of support Gilbert’s plural subject account provides for such a collectivist 
claim. The article claims that one cannot successfully support the collectivist notion 
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of collective moral responsibility in terms of the “plural subject account”. Another 
main claim of the article is that the account of collective moral responsibility built on 
the plural subject account has some important counterintuitive consequences that 
undermine its plausibility.  
‘Group action and group responsibility’ (jointly authored with Raimo 
Tuomela) is an investigation of a social group’s retrospective responsibility for its 
actions and their consequences. Here we build on Tuomela’s theory of group action 
and we argue that group responsibility can be analyzed in terms of what its members 
jointly think and do qua group members.  
When a group is held responsible for some action, its members, acting qua 
members of the group, can collectively be regarded as praiseworthy or blameworthy, 
in the light of some normative standard, for what the group has done. The paper aims 
at giving necessary and sufficient conditions analysis of a group’s responsibility for 
its actions and their outcomes, and the conditions can be cashed out in terms of the 
group’s members joint and other actions. This article is an attempt to make a positive 
contribution to the literature by way of providing at least a sketch of what an 
individualist and yet not reductionist account of collective moral/normative 
responsibility could look like. 
‘The collectivist approach to collective moral responsibility’ (jointly authored 
with Seumas Miller) is a critique of the collectivist approach to collective moral 
responsibility. The critique of the paper proceeds via a discussion of the accounts and 
arguments of three prominent representatives of the collectivist approach to collective 
moral responsibility, namely, Margaret Gilbert, Russell Hardin and Philip Pettit. The 
aims of the article are mainly critical. However, we also advocate an alternative to the 
collectivist approach, namely an individualist account of collective responsibility 
according to which collective responsibility is ascribed to individuals. In the view 
advocated, each member of the group is individually morally responsible for the 
outcome of the joint action but each is individually responsible jointly with others.   
In ‘Collective agents and moral responsibility’ I attempt to identify some 
significant problems with which I believe the collectivist position is afflicted. These 
problems have to do with the family of application conditions of moral responsibility 
typically discussed under such concepts as ownership, autonomy, freedom, and 
control. Indeed, these problems argued to be serious enough to make the collectivist 
position untenable at least as long as the notion of moral responsibility employed 
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presupposes agency. I argue that, due to their constitution, collective agents are such 
agents that it necessarily would be unfair to hold them morally responsible in their 
own right. I proceed mainly in respect to Pettit’s account of collective agents. 
However, although the focus is primarily on Pettit’s account, I suggest that the idea of 
this paper is generalizable, as the premises or assumptions on which the critical points 
are based are widely shared by the proponents of the collectivist camp.  
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Introduction 
The claim of the work  
 
This dissertation aims to offer an indirect defence of the individualist position in the 
debate concerning collective moral responsibility. As such it swims against the 
general tide as it were. However, the individualism defended in the dissertation is of a 
rather weak kind, allowing a range of collective entities. Basically, the main claim of 
the thesis is that only human agents qualify as moral agents, and thus moral 
responsibility, either individual or collective, is to be ascribed to individual agents 
either individually or collectively.  
One of the main lines of reasoning in the debate between collectivists and 
individualists about collective moral responsibility runs roughly as follows: i) moral 
responsibility presupposes agency; ii) (certain kinds of) collectives have beliefs, form 
intentions and act on those intentions (in their own right as it were) and as such 
qualify as agents in their own right, pretty much on a par with individual human 
beings; iii) thus (certain kinds of) collectives can bear moral responsibility 
independently of their constitutive members, or, to use the common phrase, in their 
own right.    
A major part of the articles consist of critical arguments against representative 
accounts employing the kind of reasoning characterized above. One of the papers 
introduces a sketch of an individualist alternative. 
The topic of collective responsibility has been discussed in many disciplines 
and from various angles over the last seventy years. In the following pages I aim to 
locate the debate of my dissertation on the more general map of the issues discussed 
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in the collective responsibility literature. After that I will provide a brief introduction 
of each one of them.  
 
PART I: Individual responsibility 
 
The arguments developed in the articles of the thesis presuppose that the notion of 
moral responsibility is the same in both individual and collective contexts. Below I 
discuss briefly those aspects of the debate on individual responsibility that are 
relevant for the discussion of collective responsibility in the articles of the thesis. 
As a wide range of different ideas can be covered with the expressions 
‘responsibility’, ‘responsible’, and ‘responsible for’, it is appropriate to say something 
about the sense intended here. The articles of this dissertation focus on retrospective 
moral responsibility. Roughly, we can say that an agent is morally responsible for 
some state of affairs (an action, omission, or consequences of action or omission) if 
the agent is deserving of praise or blame for that state according to a particular moral 
norm or an ethical system. The possible objects of responsibility include actions and 
omissions, and consequences of actions and omissions and possibly also attitudes and 
emotions. 
This sense of responsibility will be distinguished from legal responsibility, 
causal responsibility, and prospective responsibility.
1
  
The vast philosophical literature on moral responsibility has until relatively 
recently been focused solely on the moral responsibility borne by an individual agent.  
The main themes of the literature have been, and still are: i) the concept of the moral 
responsibility, ii) the practice of holding agents morally responsible, iii) the 
conditions under which the concept of moral responsibility is properly applied, and 
iv) the criteria of a moral agent. 
The sense of moral responsibility most predominant in the literature is the 
backward looking, retrospective sense of moral responsibility that grounds the blame 
                                                 
1
 Moral responsibility in the retrospective sense is backward looking. If an agent is held responsible in 
the retrospective sense, then what he is held responsible for lies in the past. The prospective sense of 
responsibility is forward looking, the object of responsibility lies ahead and responsibility is duty – 
like, for instance, a lifeguard is responsible for seeing to it that no one drowns. Causal responsibility 
concerns only causal relations, being a cause, and as such does not involve normative aspect. Legal 
responsibility concerns responsibility ascribed in accordance with the rule of law.  
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or praise in something the agent has done. A paradigm case for moral responsibility in 
this sense can be characterized along the following lines:  
An agent, A, is morally responsible for performing X if: A intentionally, 
deliberately, or on purpose performs X, X is morally wrong, A knows that X is 
morally wrong, and A is not coerced to perform X, or under external pressure to 
perform X. 
Attributions of moral responsibility in this sense can be characterized in terms 
of the following guiding principles. Difference principle: an agent is only accountable 
for a harm if something the agent did, or failed to do, make a difference to the harm’s 
occurrence; Control principle: an agent is only accountable for events over which he 
or she had control, and whose occurrence he or she could have prevented; Autonomy 
principle: an agent is not accountable for the harm another agent causes, unless he or 
she has induced or coerced that agent into performing the act related to the harm.  
Together these principles of accountability define an individualistic 
conception of moral agency and the corresponding conception of moral responsibility. 
This conception of accountability is individualistic in three senses: i) its subject is an 
individual moral agent; ii) the object of accountability, or the harm or wrong for 
which the subject is reproached (or praised), is ascribable to that subject alone (“every 
man for himself”); iii) the basis of accountability, or the grounds for holding the 
subject accountable, consists primarily in facts about that subject, such as the 
subject’s causal contributions or the content of the subject’s intentions. 
Paradigmatically, individual moral agents are reproached, or reproach themselves, for 
harms ascribable to them and them alone, on the basis of their intentional actions and 
causal contributions (see C. Kutz, 2000). 
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1. The concept of moral responsibility
2
 
 
One of the most influential accounts of the concept of moral responsibility was 
introduced in Peter Strawson’s classic paper “Freedom and Resentment” (1962/1993).  
Strawson’s view explains moral responsibility in terms of the practice of holding 
people responsible. The practice, in turn, is cashed out in terms of moral reactive 
attitudes, like indignation, love, respect, forgiveness, resentment, guilt, and gratitude, 
(to blame or praise is to express these attitudes). Being morally responsible is to be 
subject to these attitudes. By “reactive attitudes” Strawson refers to a range of 
attitudes that “belong to our involvement or participation with others in interpersonal 
human relationships” (P. F. Strawson, 1962/1993, p. 194). Our attitudes toward other 
persons appear to be significantly different from those we entertain toward nonhuman 
animals and inanimate objects. Our adopting reactive attitudes toward other persons 
evidences that we are engaged with persons in a distinctive manner. Non-persons can 
be used, exploited, manipulated, or perhaps just enjoyed. We do not take reactive 
attitudes toward non-persons, we view non-persons from a more detached and 
                                                 
2
 Here I only briefly discuss two social accounts of moral responsibility. Social accounts of moral 
responsibility stress the “social” dimension of moral responsibility, the fact that holding someone (else) 
morally responsible involves deeming that person a fitting target of certain attitudes and practices. 
Other relevant accounts include at least the following: 
Marina Oshana has offered an alternative social conception of moral responsibility (M. 
Oshana, 1997). On Oshana’s approach, being morally responsible for something entails being 
accountable for it, and “’X is accountable for Y’ can be unpacked as ‘It is appropriate that X explain 
her intentions in doing or being Y’” According to Oshana, the accountability idea is more basic than 
the Strawsonian idea of being a suitable target of the reactive attitudes. On her approach, an agent is 
not morally responsible because she is an apt target for the reactive attitudes; rather, the agent is an apt 
target for the reactive attitudes because she is morally responsible, that is, it is fitting to demand that 
she give a certain sort of explanation of her behavior or her being a particular way. (M. Fischer, 1999.) 
As to non-social accounts: Gary Watson (1996) distinguishes between two notions of 
responsibility: self-disclosure (attributability) and accountability. Self-disclosure or attributability sense 
of responsibility concerns the action’s being attributed to the agent as his own, and as such serving as 
the basis for moral appraisal. Accountability sense of responsibility is social and involves the reactive 
attitudes and associated (blaming and praising) practices. According to Watson, in the former sense of 
responsibility we hold an agent to be responsible and in the latter sense we hold an agent responsible. 
M. Zimmerman (1988) proposes a ledger view of moral responsibility. On “ledger views” ascriptions 
of moral responsibility are understood primarily as a form of moral accounting that keeps track of the 
worth of agents. Here I just mention some metaphors that have been used to express this picture of 
responsibility: “praising someone may be said to constitute judging that there is a credit in his ledger of 
life, or a positive mark in his report card of life, or a luster on his record as a person; that his record has 
been burnished, that his moral standing has been enhanced. On this view, someone is praiseworthy if 
he is deserving of such praise; that is, if it is correct, or true to the facts, to judge that there is a credit in 
his ledger, etc. Someone is blameworthy if he is deserving of such blame; that is, if it is correct, or true 
to the facts, to judge that there is a debit in his ledger, etc.” Susan Wolf introduces the reason view, 
according to which responsibility depends on the ability to act in accordance with the True and Good. 
The reason view is committed to the curious claim that being psychologically determined to perform 
good actions is compatible with deserving praise for them, but being psychologically determined to 
perform bad actions is not compatible with deserving blame. (See S. Wolf, 1990, p. 79.) 
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objective perspective. In summary, Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility 
analyze responsibility in terms of the reactive attitudes and certain associated 
practices, such as punishment and moral reward.    
In his Responsibility and Moral Sentiments (1994) R. J. Wallace discusses 
Strawson’s account of moral responsibility at length and then elaborates a 
Strawsonian view of moral responsibility. We can formulate Wallace’s view 
concisely as follows: “An agent is morally responsible insofar as it is fair to hold him 
morally responsible. This is then a normative conception of moral responsibility to the 
extent that normative issues concerning the fairness of the adoption of the stance of 
holding someone morally responsible and thus applying the reactive attitudes and 
associated sanctions help to determine whether someone is morally responsible.”  
Wallace draws a distinction between holding someone morally responsible 
and that individual’s being morally responsible; the latter is defined in part in terms of 
the former. In Wallace’s view, holding people morally responsible involves “being 
susceptible to reactive attitudes” in dealing with them. Wallace restricts the list of 
reactive attitudes to resentment, indignation, and guilt, whereas P. F. Strawson, and 
many Strawsonians, think of reactive attitudes as including the wide array of emotions 
characteristically present in interpersonal relations (as opposed to our relations with 
non-persons). In Wallace’s view, the attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt 
are linked by related propositional objects. Episodes of guilt, resentment, and 
indignation are all caused by the belief that a moral expectation to which one holds a 
person has been breached: “The reactive attitudes are explained exclusively by beliefs 
about the violation of moral obligations (construed as strict prohibitions or 
requirements) whereas other moral sentiments are explained by beliefs about the 
various modalities of moral value” (R. J. Wallace, 1994, p. 38). Not only does the 
stance of holding someone morally responsible include susceptibility to the reactive 
emotions, but it also typically involves the application of moral sanctions which serve 
to express these emotions.  
In the articles that follow and together make up my thesis I have employed 
Wallace’s notion of moral responsibility as my starting point in the critiques of the 
collectivist understanding of collective moral responsibility. However, the arguments 
do not hang on Wallacian notion of moral responsibility, so that the critical arguments 
would, I believe, maintain their relevance even if some other notion of moral 
responsibility were chosen, since the arguments turn on such agency requirements that 
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are presupposed by all accounts of moral responsibility. Wallace’s normative account 
of moral responsibility is cherished in the articles for a number of reasons: i) it allows 
for a distinction between holding an agent responsible and agent’s being responsible, 
ii) it leaves conceptual space for a critique of the practices of holding agents 
responsible and thus improves on Strawsonian accounts, and iii) it takes the practice 
of holding agents responsible as a central ingredient of the notion of moral 
responsibility.  
  
2. Conditions of application 
 
An important part of the philosophical literature on moral responsibility has focused 
on specifying the conditions of application of the concept of moral responsibility. The 
broadly speaking “Aristotelian” conditions on moral responsibility require that an 
agent meet certain “epistemic” and “freedom-relevant” conditions. Put negatively, the 
agent must not be ignorant of certain crucial features or consequences of her 
behaviour, and she must not be “forced” to behave as she does. Both the epistemic 
and the freedom-relevant conditions are important, but the discussion in the literature 
has focused more on freedom-relevant conditions. (M. Fischer, 1999, for epistemic 
conditions see I. Haji, 1998, and J. Feinberg, 1986, pp. 269-315).    
Freedom conditions of moral responsibility have been discussed in terms of 
such freedom relevant concepts as autonomy, ownership, and self-control.  
Traditionally, the most influential view about the sort of freedom that is 
necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility posits that this sort of freedom 
involves the availability of genuinely open alternative possibilities at certain key 
points in one’s life. Arguably, without this sort of alternative possibility, one is 
compelled to do as one actually does. Some philosophers talk in terms of freedom, 
other prefer to talk of control. 
The traditional view here is that moral responsibility for behaviour requires 
the sort of control that involves genuinely available alternative possibilities at some 
point suitably related to the time of the behaviour in question. The intuitive picture 
behind the “alternative possibilities control requirement” is that moral responsibility 
requires that the agent select one from among various genuinely open paths the world 
might take. This picture involves two important ideas. One is that there must be 
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various paths genuinely available to the agent, at least at some times suitably related 
to the time of the behaviour in question. The other one is that the agent, and not some 
outside force or mere chance, selects which path will be the path into the future.
3
 
 
3. Responsibility undermining factors 
 
Perhaps we can get a better grip of the conditions of the moral responsibility by way 
of looking at the responsibility undermining factors – factors and circumstances that 
seem to make it unfair or not justified to hold an agent responsible, blame or praise, 
for what he or she has done. The classic Aristotelian “responsibility undermining 
conditions” are ignorance and coercion. 
In this context J. L. Austin (1979) draws a distinction between justification 
and excuses. Let us consider a case where an agent, A, apparently does X, and X, on 
the face of it, is morally wrong. In the case of justification, we admit that A indeed did 
(or performed) X but X, in general or under the specific circumstances in question, is 
not wrong but rather it is permissible or even obligatory. Whereas in the case of 
excuses we admit that X is impermissible or wrong but we argue that A did not 
(intentionally) do or perform X.  
Again, we can make a further distinction between “excusing conditions” and 
“exempting conditions” along the following lines: The excusing conditions do not 
refer to the moral agency but more locally to particular actions. Examples of excusing 
conditions are: Inadvertence, Mistake, or Accident; Unintentional Bodily Movements: 
Physical Constraint; and Coercion, Necessity, and Duress. (R. J. Wallace, 1996.) 
In these cases, the agent did not intentionally perform or omit the action the 
agent was morally obliged to refrain from doing or to do. Exemptive conditions 
concern the moral agency. Examples of exemptive conditions are: Mental illness or 
                                                 
3
 A good deal of the debate concerning the freedom conditions of moral responsibility boils down to 
the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate about whether moral responsibility is compatible with 
determinism or whether moral responsibility requires a stronger notion of freedom which is not 
compatible with deterministic world. I cannot go into this debate here, I just contend myself to 
mentioning that in that debate one of the turning points has been Harry Frankfurt’s Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (1969) in which Frankfurt argues that if moral responsibility is 
not compatible with determinism this is not because of the lack of alternate possibilities because moral 
responsibility is compatible with lack of alternate possibilities. As a result of this the focus of the 
discussion, in particular in the compatibilist camp, has been on the control conditions required by moral 
responsibility, that is on explicating the second idea of the intuitive picture. 
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insanity, extreme youth, psychopathy, and the effects of systematic behaviour control 
or conditioning. Here the point is the lack of capacities required for moral 
responsibility, not the failure to exercise the capacities. For example, according to 
Wallace, moral responsibility requires what he calls “the powers of reflective self-
control” which include for an agent: “1) the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, 
and 2) the power to control or regulate his behavior by the light of such reasons” (R. 
J. Wallace, 1996, p. 157). 
 
4. Moral agency 
 
Herein my aim is not to provide a review of the literature on moral agency but very 
briefly to introduce the agency requirements of moral responsibility that do some 
work in the argumentation of the articles of the thesis. 
First of all, I will take for granted that moral responsibility is an “agential 
property”, that is, moral responsibility presupposes agency. However, since not all 
agents qualify as bearers of moral responsibility, or moral duties, then moral 
responsibility requires more than the capacity to act intentionally. As to the idea of 
agency, here I follow Alfred R. Mele and employ the notion of an agent according to 
which “An agent is, by definition, something that acts; and if, at a time, something 
acts, that thing is an agent then” (A. Mele, unpublished ms). Thus, a dog that acts is a 
canine agent at the time of its acting. However, we do not seriously ascribe moral 
responsibility to dogs. Accordingly, the bearer of moral responsibility has to be an 
agent that satisfies further conditions over and above its capability to act intentionally. 
In other words, the bearer of moral responsibility has to be a moral agent. A moral 
agent can be (almost vacuously) characterised as an entity that can have moral 
obligations and bear moral responsibility. The conditions of moral agency have to do 
with the agent’s capacity to act freely, the agent’s capacity to understand normative 
reasons, and the agent’s capacity to execute intentions in a controlled manner.   
For instance, according to Peter French, a moral agent must be an actor. To 
qualify as an actor an entity must: a) display the ability to act intentionally, b) display 
the ability to make rational decisions and to consider rational arguments regarding its 
intentions, and c) have the capacity to respond to events and ethical criticism by 
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altering intentions and patterns of behaviour that are harmful to others or detrimental 
to its interests. (P. French, 1984, p. 12) 
Jay L. Wallace characterises the requirements of moral agency as follows 
“Being a responsible moral agent … primarily involves a form of normative 
competence: the ability to grasp and apply moral reasons, and to govern one’s 
behaviour by the light of such reasons”. (R. J. Wallace, 1994, p. 1) 
Philip Pettit provides us with the following, arguably individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient, conditions for someone to be fit to be held responsible in a 
given choice: 1) Value relevance: the agent is an autonomous agent and faces a value-
relevant choice involving the possibility of doing something good or bad or right or 
wrong; 2) Value judgement: the agent has the understanding and access to evidence 
required for being able to make judgements about the relative value of such options, 
and 3) Value sensitivity: the agent has the control necessary for being able to choose 
between options on the basis of judgements about their value. (P. Pettit, 2007.) I do 
not contest these conditions in my thesis rather I accept them for the arguments sake 
and use them as premises in the argumentation against the moral responsibility 
attributed to a collective agent. 
From the point of view of my articles on collective moral responsibility the 
central features of the notions of moral agency are self-determination in relation to, 
control over and “owner-ship” of action figuring in or entailed by all notions of moral 
agency known to me. In the articles that follow I have not committed myself to any 
specific account of moral agency. 
 
PART II: Collective responsibility  
 
The notion of collective responsibility associates blameworthiness with groups, and 
under some interpretations construes groups as moral agents in their own right, 
whereas the traditional notion of moral responsibility grounds moral blameworthiness 
in the wills of discrete individuals who freely cause harm. Hence, the notion of 
collective responsibility does not fit easily into the prevailing philosophical literature 
on moral responsibility. Nor has it been accepted by those who are used to construing 
moral agency in purely individualistic terms.  
In the following articles it is argued that the individualistic, or at least anti-
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collectivist, understanding of moral agency is correct. However, this is not assumed to 
undermine the notion of collective moral responsibility as a viable notion. The line of 
reasoning in this work, roughly, is that there is (and can be) no viable (collectivist) 
account of collective moral agency and since the notion of moral responsibility both 
in collective and individual cases presupposes agency, the viable notion of collective 
moral responsibility is to be explicated along the lines of (irreducible) joint moral 
responsibility of individual agents. (A sketch of such an anti-collectivist account of 
collective responsibility is offered in article 2 of this thesis “Group Action and Group 
Responsibility”, Protosociology, Mäkelä and Tuomela)  
 
1. Short History of the study of collective responsibility  
 
Collective responsibility is a topic of growing interest among moral philosophers, 
philosophers of action and social action, and indeed philosophers of the social 
sciences more generally. This interest is part of the more general trend of broadening 
the scope of morality to collectivities and groups, e.g. business corporations. Until 
recently, almost all Western moral philosophers have approached the subject of 
responsibility armed with the assumption that the only interesting and important 
things to be said on this topic must concern individual human beings. If ordinary 
ascriptions of moral responsibility appeared to be directed sometimes at groups, 
organizations, or corporate bodies, such claims were taken to be either nonsensical or 
ultimately reducible to statements about individual human beings. This is no longer 
the case.  On the one hand, the societies of the twentieth and twenty first century have 
been, and are facing important ethical problems that are extremely difficult to be dealt 
with by the conceptual tools of a strictly individualistic moral philosophy. Indeed, 
Peter French (1984), one of the prominent figures in the field, claims that collective 
responsibility is a central concept, perhaps the most important concept, if we are to 
understand and deal with a spectrum of claims and ascriptions made by and about 
various groups in our society about justice, compensation, group guilt, etc., and as we 
wrestle with global social and environmental problems that could well determine the 
quality of human life for generations to come. On the other hand, philosophers of the 
social sciences, of social action in particular, have developed new theories about 
collective and social action and conceptual tools to deal with the problems of 
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collective and corporate agency. These can be fruitfully used in dealing with the 
problems of collective responsibility. Thus, there are both practical and theoretical 
reasons that explain the growing interest in the topic of collective responsibility 
amongst professional philosophers. However, interest in collective responsibility is 
not limited only to philosophers; social scientists, political theorists, and legal 
theorists are also working on the topic. We might say that collective responsibility is 
an interdisciplinary topic par excellence. 
The philosophical literature on collective responsibility is an interesting 
reflection of social and political turmoil in the world. In the recent past the 
Nuremberg trials of the 1940's brought on the first wave of analysis of the concept. H. 
D. Lewis (1948), Karl Jaspers (1961) and Hannah Arendt (1963/1977), focused in 
their writings on collective responsibility on the question whether or not the German 
people can legitimately be held collectively responsible for World War II Nazi 
crimes. Sanford Levinson (1974), Richard Wasserstrom (1971) and others produced 
their own arguments about collective responsibility in light of the Nuremberg trials. 
Another wave followed the Eichmann trial of the early 1960s, see, for example, 
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963/1977). In the late 1960s, a great surge 
of interest occurred in response to the race riots, student demonstrations, and the 
Vietnam War, especially the My Lai Massacre. Two important journals, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs and Social Theory and Practice, were founded to give philosophers 
a forum for writing about the current social and political events such as Vietnam War. 
In the early 1970s a seminal book of essays on collective responsibility by leading 
moral philosophers was published, namely, Individual and Collective Responsibility: 
the Massacre at My Lai edited by Peter French (1972). The Kitty Genovese murder 
and corporate scandals of all kinds influenced much of the philosophical work done 
on collective responsibility during the 1970s and 80s, including that of Peter French, 
Larry May, and Virginia Held, see, e.g., P. French’s Collective and Corporate 
Responsibility (1984). During the last three decades, the discussion of responsibility 
of non-organized collectives has revived as well, see, e.g., Larry May, The Morality of 
Groups (1987), G. Mellema, Collective Responsibility (1997), and L. May, Sharing 
Responsibility (1992). In addition to pure philosophical interest in the concept
4
, the 
existence of environmental problems, the oppression of minorities (sexism and 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Larry May (1987 and 1992), Howard McGray (1986), Marilyn Friedman (M. Friedman and 
L. May 1980), and Anthony Appiah (1987). 
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racism), and corporate crime are issues that, at least partly, helps to explain the 
interest in the topic of collective responsibility during the last three decades.  
 
2.  About the discussion of collective responsibility  
 
The term “collective responsibility” is used in many ways in the literature. Sometimes 
by saying that several people are collectively responsible for a state of affairs we 
intend that each of these people is individually responsible for this same state of 
affairs. For example: suppose several people throw paint at a public mural in an effort 
to deface it. Then, even though each person contributes in different ways to the 
defacing of the mural, each comes to bear responsibility for the subsequent state of 
affairs. In this sense they can be said to share responsibility for the defacing of the 
mural. Quite commonly in the literature this sense is called “shared responsibility”. A 
different usage of the term “collective responsibility” assigns responsibility to a single 
entity, the collective, consisting of the various people who constitute it. According to 
this usage, to say that several people are collectively responsible for a state of affairs 
is to say that responsibility is borne by the collective consisting of these people. 
Whether the people themselves are responsible as individuals for this state of affairs is 
an entirely separate question; all that is asserted is that these people belong to a 
collective, which is itself the bearer of responsibility. Think of the claim “The club as 
a whole is to blame for being relegated.” We can interpret this claim as making an 
attribution to the collective as such but not necessarily to any of its members.   
The notion of collective responsibility typically refers to both the causal 
responsibility of moral agents for harm in the world and the blameworthiness that we 
ascribe to them for having caused such harm. Hence, it is, like personal responsibility 
and shared responsibility, almost always a notion of moral, rather than merely causal, 
responsibility. But, unlike its two more purely individualistic counterparts, collective 
responsibility, under a collectivist rendering, associates both causal responsibility and 
blameworthiness with groups and locates the source of moral responsibility in the 
collective actions taken by these groups understood as collectives. 
Before considering more specific questions and arguments, it is reasonable to 
say something about the discussion of collective moral responsibility in general terms.  
The discussion here can be usefully described as a debate between individualists and 
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collectivists. The setting is, in many respects, analogical and related to the holism-
individualism debate in the social sciences.  
As already suggested, we are often willing to hold collectivities morally 
accountable for their actions, yet philosophical theories have tended to restrict moral 
agency to individual agents. Many philosophers are ethical individualists who deny 
the intelligibility of statements attributing moral responsibility to collectives, except 
in cases where  such statements are semantically reducible, or logically equivalent, to 
complex attributions of responsibility to individual persons. Furthermore, ethical 
individualists argue that collective responsibility violates principles of both individual 
responsibility and fairness. Methodological individualists challenge the very 
possibility of associating moral agency with groups, as distinct from their individual 
members. The central issues here are in ethics, semantics, metaphysics, and action 
theory. Ethical collectivists claim that there are intelligible and defendable statements 
attributing moral responsibility to collectives, which are not so reducible. 
The opponents of the notion of collective responsibility usually raise the 
following two worries. First, if we accept responsibility attributions to collectives the 
responsibility just fades away – collective responsibility is equivalent in the end to no 
responsibility whatsoever. Second, if we accept responsibility ascriptions to 
collectives we are subsequently inclined to hold agents responsible for someone else’s 
action and this seems unjustified according to the critics of collective responsibility. 
Further in addition to these two concerns there is a third basic worry in trade, namely 
the ontological worry that by accepting the notion of collective responsibility we 
commit ourselves to some fuzzy holistic entities.  
Defenders of collective responsibility set out to demonstrate that the majority 
of critical arguments made about collective responsibility are unfounded and that 
collective responsibility – along with its assumptions of group intentions, collective 
actions, and group blameworthiness – is both coherent as an intellectual construct and 
fair to ascribe in at least some, if not all, cases. 
The notion of collective responsibility has become the source of three major 
philosophical controversies by virtue of its nature as a group-based construct. The 
first controversy focuses on the relationship between collective responsibility, on the 
one hand, and the values of individual liberty, justice, and non-suffering, on the other. 
The participants in this controversy ask such questions as: How can we ascribe moral 
responsibility to groups for harms that only a few of its members directly caused 
 14 
without violating principles of individual freedom and responsibility? How can we 
ascribe collective responsibility in such cases without treating those individuals who 
did not directly cause harm unjustly? What happens in cases where the harm in 
question is both very serious and genuinely the product of many hands or the group as 
a whole? How can we not ascribe collective responsibility to groups in these cases 
and still hope to prevent such harm from occurring in the future? 
The second controversy concentrates on the metaphysical foundations of 
collective responsibility and its coherence as an intellectual construct. Here the 
participants ask: How can we understand the notion of collective responsibility as a 
matter of moral – and not just causal – responsibility? Is it possible for groups, as 
distinct from their members, to cause harm in the sense required by moral 
responsibility? Is it possible for groups, as distinct from their members, in their own 
right as it were, to be morally blameworthy for bringing about harm? Is it only 
organized collectives with an internal decision-making structure that can bear moral 
responsibility? My articles in this thesis aim at contributing to this controversy. 
The third controversy is not actually about the moral responsibility of groups 
at all. Instead, it is about the moral responsibility of individuals who belong to groups 
in cases where these groups are themselves thought to be morally responsible for 
particular cases of harm. Here the key questions are: How can we distribute collective 
responsibility across individual members of such a group? Does it make sense to 
distribute collective responsibility in general? Is it appropriate to hold individual 
group members morally responsible for harm caused by other group members? If so, 
under what conditions and with respect to what particular kinds of groups it is 
appropriate?  
Consider the relation between individual members of a collective and 
collective responsibility. Here we can distinguish the main positions as follows (see, 
e.g., Gregory F. Mellema, 1997, p. 5): According to a “blunt individualistic position”, 
a collective bears responsibility for a state of affairs only if every member of the 
collective bears responsibility for the same state of affairs (see, e.g., S. Sverdlik, 
1987). At the opposing end of the spectrum there is a position which one might call a 
“strong collectivist position”. According to philosophers of a collectivist persuasion, a 
central notion of collective moral responsibility is moral responsibility assigned to a 
collective as a single entity. In their view “collective responsibility” should be 
understood in the sense of a collective’s responsibility. Whether the members of a 
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collective, that is, the people who constitute the collective in question, are 
individually responsible is a separate question. When it comes to collective moral 
responsibility, the collective itself is the bearer of such responsibility. In David 
Copp’s terminology this claim is equivalent to the claim that a collective can be an 
independent moral agent (D. Copp, 1980, pp. 147-150). An important corollary of the 
strong collectivist view is that collectives are capable of bearing moral responsibility 
for actions and/or outcomes, yet none of their members are in any degree individually 
morally responsible for those actions and/or outcomes. The most prevalent view in the 
middle of the spectrum is that collectives can bear responsibility for a state of affairs 
even in situations where one or more of its members fail to bear responsibility for the 
same state of affairs. (See, e.g., D. E. Cooper, 1968, V. Held, 1970, S. Bates, 1971, P. 
French, 1984.)  
 
3. Argumentative strategies in the debate 
3.1 Critics of collective moral responsibility 
 
The main lines of critique of collective moral responsibility consist of arguments for 
one of the following claims: a) It is unfair to hold individuals responsible for what 
they have not done, this claim presupposes a distributive sense of collective 
responsibility. b) Collectives cannot have intentions in the sense required by moral 
responsibility. c) Collectives cannot do harm in the sense required by moral 
responsibility. d) Collectives cannot satisfy the criteria of agency. e) Collectives 
cannot satisfy the criteria of moral agency and moral responsibility requires moral 
agency. 
For the critics, two claims are of central importance. The first is that groups, 
unlike individuals, cannot form intentions and hence cannot be understood to act or to 
cause harm qua groups. The second is that groups, as distinct from their individual 
members, cannot be understood as morally blameworthy in the sense required by 
moral responsibility. 
Both claims stem from a form of methodological individualism of the sort 
articulated by both Max Weber and H. D. Lewis in their respective rejections of 
collective responsibility. Weber argues that collective responsibility makes no sense 
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both because we cannot isolate genuinely collective actions as distinct from identical 
actions of many persons, and because groups, unlike the individuals who belong to 
them, cannot think as groups or formulate intentions of the kind normally thought to 
be necessary to actions (The first volume of Economy and Society 1914/1978). In his 
seminal 1948 paper ”Collective Responsibility” H.D. Lewis follows suit and argues in 
a passionate manner against the concept and more generally against the claims of 
collective responsibility. Lewis believed that if we were to take collective 
responsibility claims seriously, the very concept of individual moral responsibility 
would be eroded. His attack was based on the intuition that no one can be held 
responsible for the actions of another person. “Value,” Lewis (1948, pp. 3-6) writes, 
“belongs to the individual and it is the individual who is the sole bearer of moral 
responsibility” and “No one is morally guilty except in relation to some conduct 
which he himself considered to be wrong.” On Lewis’s account, the idea of  collective 
responsibility must destroy what is arguably the most central conception of Western 
ethics, namely the moral accountability of the individual.  
Contemporary critics of collective responsibility do not typically go as far as 
Lewis. They do, however, generally share Lewis’ skepticism about the possibility of 
both group intentions and genuinely collective actions. They, too, worry about the 
fairness of ascribing collective responsibility to individuals who do not themselves 
directly cause harm or alternatively who do not bring about harm purposefully. For 
instance, Stephen Sverdlik (1987, p. 68) writes that: “It would be unfair, whether we 
are considering a result produced by more than one person's action or by a single 
person, to blame a person for a result that he or she did not intend to produce.”  
Thus, the central claims of these critics are that genuinely collective actions 
are not possible and that it would be unfair to consider agents morally blameworthy 
for harm that they did not intentionally bring about. Both of these claims build on 
significant normative assumptions concerning intentions. The first assumption is that 
actions not beginning with intentions are not actions proper but kinds of behavior 
instead. The second assumption is that the agent held responsible must have bad 
intentions or be morally faulty to be morally blameworthy.  
The critical line of reasoning from the first assumption runs along the 
following lines: Collective responsibility, understood in the sense of a collective’s 
responsibility, is not a viable notion because groups, not having minds of their own, 
cannot form intentions required by actions in the proper sense, as opposed to mere 
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behavior, and thus groups cannot act (intentionally). As there is no collective action 
proper, there is no collective responsibility either. Only individuals can act, and thus 
only individuals can bear responsibility. 
In accordance with the second assumption, collective responsibility requires 
groups or collectives to have the ability to have bad intentions or to be morally faulty. 
This ability is questioned by the critics: How can groups or collectives, as distinct 
from their individual members, be understood to have bad intentions or to be morally 
faulty? How can they be understood as appropriate bearers of moral blameworthiness, 
guilt, or shame? 
One of the critics, Jan Narveson, goes as far as to argue that the bearers of 
moral blameworthiness have to be individuals because only individuals can have 
moral agency. “Nothing else,” he writes, “can literally be the bearer of full 
responsibility.” (J. Narveson, 2002, p. 179, for critiques along these lines see, J. W. N. 
Watkins, 1957, R. S. Downie, 1969, A. Goldman, 1970, S. Sverdlik, 1987, and J. A. 
Corlett, 2001). 
The critique in the articles of my thesis focuses in the main on the moral 
agency of the groups or collectives. 
  
3.2 Defenders of collective responsibility 
 
Defenders of the viability of the notion of collective responsibility avail themselves of 
various strategies. Sometimes they draw on linguistic analyses, and at other times they 
discuss intuitive cases in which both individualists and collectivists must (arguably) 
be willing to accept that the collective itself is the bearer of moral responsibility, and 
which are conceptually coherent as well as normatively and metaphysically 
plausible.
5
 Again, they argue, contrary to the aforementioned critics, that collectives 
can act and form intentions, and that collectives of a certain kind satisfy the 
conditions of agency required by moral responsibility in their own right (see e.g. M. 
                                                 
5
 On the basis of such cases, and the assumption that responsibility presupposes agency, David Copp  
(2006, 2007) has recently introduced an argument for the need for genuine collectives in our ontology 
of agents to accommodate the kinds of normative judgments we make about them.   
The argument goes as follows: 
(1) We correctly assign blame to collectives in circumstances in which it would be a mistake to 
assign any (relevantly related) blame to their members.   
(2) If (1), then collectives are genuine agents over and above their members.   
(3) Therefore, collectives are genuine agents over and above their members. 
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Gilbert, P. French, P. Pettit). They also argue against reducibility of the collective 
responsibility in terms of the possibility of changing membership collectives, 
One of the strategies used by defendants is to point out both that we blame 
groups all the time in everyday life and that we do so in a way that is difficult to 
analyze in terms of individualism. For instance, David Cooper writes, “[t]here is an 
obvious point to be recognized and that obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed 
to collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are held towards 
collectives as well as towards individuals,” (D. Cooper, 1968, p. 258.) 
However, the defenders of collective responsibility do not typically content 
themselves with an analysis of our use of language, which may obviously be wrong. 
Instead, they acknowledge the need to demonstrate that the responsibility ascriptions 
to collectives cannot be analyzed in terms of individual responsibility. Cooper 
explores cases associated with sports clubs and nations. According to Cooper, when 
we look at how such collectives act, we see that we cannot deduce statements about 
particular individuals from the statements about collectives. “This is so, because the 
existence of a collective is compatible with varying membership. No determinate set 
of individuals is necessary for the existence of the collective.” (D. Cooper 1968, p. 
260)
6
 
Margaret Gilbert develops what she calls a “plural-subject account” of shared 
intentions to justify the coherence of collective responsibility (M. Gilbert, 1989 and 
2000). She does so in large part by zeroing in on joint commitments. According to 
Gilbert, group intentions exist when two or more persons constitute the plural subject 
of an intention to carry out a particular action, or, in other words, when “they are 
jointly committed to intending as a body to do A” (M. Gilbert, 2000, p. 22). Gilbert’s 
account is discussed at some length in the thesis. 
Philip Pettit argues that collectives organized in certain way deserve 
ontological recognition as agents in their own right, as subjects that are “minded in a 
way starkly discontinuous with the mentality of their members”. According to Pettit, 
certain kinds of collectives can satisfy the conditions of moral responsibility, and, 
indeed, such collectives are as fit as any individual human being to be held 
                                                 
6
 In a similar vein, Peter French focuses on that class of predicates that, he contends, can only be true of 
collectives. According to French, “[t]here is a class of predicates that just cannot be true of individuals, 
that can only be true of collectives. Examples of such predicates abound … and include ‘disbanded’ 
(most uses of), ‘lost the football game’, ‘elected a president’, and ‘passed an amendment’. … 
Methodological individualism would be at a loss in this context. (P. French, 1998, p. 37.)  
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responsible for what they do. Pettit’s argumentation for autonomous agency of certain 
kinds of collectives builds on his analyses of the discursive dilemma and 
collectivization of reason. (See P. Pettit, 2007.) One of the articles of my thesis 
focuses on arguing against Pettit’s account.   
 
Part III Articles of the thesis  
 
In the articles that follow I have defended the view that only individual (natural) 
agents (either solely or jointly) are proper bearers of moral responsibility. A major 
part of my thesis consists of critical evaluations of some available versions of the 
collectivist position with respect to collective moral responsibility, the position 
according to which collectives in their own right are, at least in some cases, capable of 
bearing moral responsibility independently of the individual members of the 
collective.  
My approach in the articles has been to argue that collectives in their own 
right are not capable of bearing moral responsibility and thus the collectivist rendering 
of collective moral responsibility is not a viable option. I argue herein that collectives, 
even if acceptable as agents, cannot satisfy conditions of moral responsibility in the 
way that would make it fair to hold collective agents morally responsible in their own 
right.  
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Articles 
 
 
[1] “Collective Moral Responsibility: A Collective as an Independent Moral 
Agent?”, Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
2000, 86-101.  
[2] “Group Action and Group Responsibility” (with Raimo Tuomela), 
Protosociology Vol. 16, 2002, 195-214. 
[3] “The Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility” (with Seumas 
Miller), Metaphilosophy, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2005, 634-651.  
[4] “Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, 2007, 456-469. 
 
[1] Collective moral responsibility: A collective as an independent 
moral agent 
 
This paper is the oldest in this thesis. It is therefore somewhat immature and rough, 
and the papers that follow improve on it in certain respects. The terminology of the 
title is borrowed from David Copp but the article is an attempt first to understand 
Margaret Gilbert’s holist or collectivist position and then to criticize Gilbert’s account 
of collective moral responsibility.   
The starting point of the article is Gilbert’s claim that groups can be morally 
responsible much in the same way as individual persons. Indeed, essentially the same 
claim, in one form or another, is studied in three out of four articles of this thesis. This 
article is an attempt to understand what kind of support Gilbert’s plural subject 
account provides for such a collectivist claim. More precisely the aim of the article is 
to study whether one can argue in terms of the “plural subject account” for the view 
that collectives can be independent moral agents such that they can bear moral 
responsibility independently of the individual moral responsibility of their members. 
The article claims, to put it bluntly, that one cannot successfully support the 
collectivist notion of collective moral responsibility in terms of the “plural subject 
account”. Another main claim of the article is that the account of collective moral 
responsibility built on the plural subject account has some important counterintuitive 
consequences that undermine its plausibility. I argue for these claims in terms of a 
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critical analysis of central notions of the plural subject account such as joint 
commitment, and through the use of counterexamples. 
 
 [2] Group action and group responsibility (with Raimo Tuomela) 
 
This paper I wrote jointly with Professor Raimo Tuomela, my supervisor and very 
good friend. Other articles in this thesis are mainly critical and their contribution to 
the literature is, first, the study of the arguments for collectivism with respect to 
collective moral responsibility and, second, the conclusion that they are not 
successful. This paper, on the other hand, is an investigation of a social group’s 
retrospective responsibility for its actions and their consequences. Here we build on 
Tuomela’s theory of group action and we argue that group responsibility can be 
analyzed in terms of what its members jointly think and do qua group members.  
When a group is held responsible for some action, its members, acting qua 
members of the group, can collectively be regarded as praiseworthy or blameworthy, 
in the light of some normative standard, for what the group has done. The paper aims 
at giving necessary and sufficient conditions analysis of a group’s responsibility for 
its actions and their outcomes, and the conditions can be cashed out in terms of the 
group’s members joint and other actions. This article is an attempt to make a positive 
contribution to the literature by way of providing at least a sketch of what an 
individualist and yet not reductionist account of collective moral/normative 
responsibility could look like. 
 
[3] The collectivist approach to collective moral responsibility     
(with Seumas Miller) 
 
I had the privilege and pleasure to write this paper together with Professor Seumas 
Miller. This article is a critique of what we call the collectivist approach to collective 
moral responsibility. This approach is characterized by the commitment to the idea 
that collective moral responsibility is moral responsibility assigned to a collective as a 
single entity. The critique of the paper proceeds via a discussion of the accounts and 
arguments of three prominent representatives of the collectivist approach to collective 
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moral responsibility, namely, Margaret Gilbert, Russell Hardin and Philip Pettit. We 
also discuss very briefly a relevant argument by David Copp. The aims of the article 
are mainly critical. The part on Margaret Gilbert’s view repeats to some extent the 
arguments presented in [1]. 
However, we also advocate an alternative to the collectivist approach, namely 
an individualist account of collective responsibility according to which collective 
responsibility is ascribed to individuals. In the view advocated, each member of the 
group is individually morally responsible for the outcome of the joint action but each 
is individually responsible jointly with others. As to the further development of this 
individualist view we refer to works by Seumas Miller. 
 
[4] Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility 
 
This article develops further the critique of Philip Pettit’s view that was briefly 
discussed in [3]. According to Pettit’s account, collective agents of a certain kind are 
fit to be held morally responsible in their own right. An important corollary of this 
collectivist view is that collectives are capable of bearing moral responsibility for 
actions and/or outcomes, even in case where none of their members is to any degree 
individually morally responsible for those actions and/or outcomes.  
In [4] I attempt to identify some significant problems with which I believe the 
collectivist position is afflicted. These problems have to do with the family of 
application conditions of moral responsibility typically discussed under such concepts 
as ownership, autonomy, freedom, and control. Indeed, I believe these problems to be 
serious enough to make the collectivist position untenable at least as long as the 
notion of moral responsibility employed presupposes agency. I argue that, due to their 
constitution, collective agents are such agents that it necessarily would be unfair to 
hold them morally responsible in their own right. I proceed mainly in respect to 
Pettit’s account of collective agents. However, although the focus is primarily on 
Pettit’s account, I suggest that the idea of this paper is generalizable, as the premises 
or assumptions on which the critical points are based are widely shared by the 
proponents of the collectivist camp and are not peculiar to Pettit’s account.  
Typically, the arguments in the debate between collectivists and individualists 
with respect to collective moral responsibility turn on the issue of whether collectives 
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can be agents or not. In [4] I opt for a somewhat different tack. I do not aim to deny 
that collectives of a certain kind can qualify as agents, in the sense of being capable of 
intentional action. Rather, I take seriously the idea of the agency of certain kind of 
collectives and ask whether it would be fair to hold such agents morally responsible in 
their own right. My worry is that even the most plausible accounts of collective agents 
qua distinct agents in their own right can provide us only with collective agents that 
deserve to be taken into account in considerations of fairness and yet fall short of 
satisfying the conditions of moral responsibility. Children or mentally ill people are 
agents, but it is not fair to them to hold them morally responsible—maybe something 
analogous holds for collective agents?  
In what follows I aim to build an argument according to which collectivism 
with respect to collective moral responsibility is false even if, for the sake of 
argument, we accept that some collectives can qualify as agents and that collectives of 
some sort are capable of intentional action. The core of the argument is that collective 
agents (considered as agents in their own right) necessarily fail to satisfy the 
application conditions of moral responsibility in a way that would make holding 
collective agents morally responsible in their own right fair.  
 
Literature 
 
Appiah, Anthony, 1987, “Racism and Moral Pollution”, Philosophical Forum, 18: 
185-202. 
Arendt, Hannah, 1963/1977, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil, New York: Penguin Classics. 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Terence Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1985. 
Austin, J.L., 1979. “A Plea for Excuses”, in Philosophical Papers, J.O. Urmson and 
G.J. Warnock, eds., New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bates, Stanley, 1971, “The Responsibility of ‘Random Collections’”, Ethics, 81: 343-
349. 
Cooper, David, 1968, “Collective Responsibility”, Philosophy, 43: 258-268. 
————, 1998, “Responsibility and the ‘System’”, in Peter French, ed., Individual 
and Collective Responsibility, Rochester, VT: Schenkman. 
 24 
Copp, David, 1979, “Collective Actions and Secondary Actions”, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 177-186. 
————, 1980, “Hobbes on Artificial Persons and Collective Actions”, 
Philosophical Review, 89/4: 579-606. 
————, 1984, “What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory”, 
Dialogue, 23: 253-268. 
————, 2006, “On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from 
‘Normative Autonomy’”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30: 194-221. 
————, 2007, “The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis”, Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol.XXXVIII, No. 3: 369-389. 
Corlett, J. Angelo, 2001, “Collective Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 32: 573-584. 
Downie, R. S., 1969, “Collective Responsibility”, Philosophy, 44: 66-69. 
Feinberg, Joel, 1968, “Collective Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 674-
688. 
————, 1970, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
————, 1986, Harm to Self, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law Vol. 3, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
French, Peter, 1984, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
————, 1995, Corporate Ethics, Harcourt Brace College Pub. 
————, ed., 1998, Individual and Collective Responsibility, Rochester, VT: 
Schenkman. 
Friedman, Marilyn and Larry May, 1985, “Harming Women as a Group,” Social 
Theory and Practice, 11: 218-221. 
Fischer, John Martin, 1999, “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility”, Ethics, 110 
(October): 93-139. 
————, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell. 
————, ed., 1986, Moral Responsibility, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory 
of Moral Responsibility, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 25 
————, eds., 1993, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Cornell University 
Press. 
Frankfurt, Harry, 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The 
Journal of Philosophy, 66: 828-839. 
Gilbert, Margaret, 1997, “Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings”, Journal of Ethics, 1: 
65-84. 
————, 1989, On Social Facts, New York: Routledge. 
————, 2000, Sociality and Responsibility, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Goldman, Alvin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Gomperz, H., 1939, “Individual, Collective and Social Responsibility”, Ethics, 49: 
329-342. 
Haji, Ishtiyaque, 2002, “Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility”, in 
Kane 2002. 
————, 1998, Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, H. L., 1968, Punishment and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Held, Virginia, 1970, “Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Responsible?”, 
Journal of Philosophy, 67: 471-481. 
Jackson, Frank, 1987, “Group Morality”, in Pettit, Sylvan, and Norman, eds., 
Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.C.C. Smart, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Jaspers, Karl, 1961, The Question of German Guilt, trans. by E.B. Ashton, New York: 
Capricorn. 
Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 
————, 2002, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 
Kutz, Christopher, 2000, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Levinson, Sanford, 1974, “Responsibility for Crimes of War”, in Marshall Cohen et 
al., War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
104-133. 
Lewis, H.D., 1948, “Collective Responsibility”, Philosophy, 24: 3-18. 
 26 
May, Larry and Hoffman, Stacey, eds., 1991, Collective Responsibility: Five Decades 
of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, Savage, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
May, Larry, 1992, Sharing Responsibility, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
May, Larry, 1987, The Morality of Groups, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
McGray, Howard, 1986, “Morality and Collective Liability”, Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 20: 157-165. 
McKenna, Michael, 1998, “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A 
Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 123-142. 
Mellema, Gregory, 1997, Collective Responsibility, Amsterdam: Rodopi Press. 
Narveson, Jan, 2002, “Collective Responsibility”, Journal of Ethics, 6: 179-198. 
Oshana, Marina, 1997, “Ascriptions of Responsibility”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 34: 71-83. 
Pettit, Philip, 2001, A Theory of Freedom, New York: Oxford University Press. 
————, 2007, “Responsibility Incorporated”, Ethics, 117: 171-201. 
Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed., 1987, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Strawson, Galen, 1994, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical 
Studies 75: 5-24. 
————, 1986, Freedom and Belief, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Strawson, P. F., 1962/1993, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 48:1-25. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza, 1993. 
Sverdlik, Stephen, 1987, “Collective Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 51: 61-
76. 
Velleman, David, 1997, “How to Share an Intention”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 57: 29-50. 
Wallace, James, 1974, “Excellences and Merit”, Philosophical Review 83: 182-199. 
Wallace, R. Jay, 1996, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Wasserstrom, Richard, 1971, “The Relevance of Nuremberg”, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 1: 22-46. 
Watkins, J. W. N., 1957, “Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies”, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8: 104-117. 
 27 
Watson, Gary, 1996, “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics, 24: 227-
248. 
————, 1986, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, in Schoeman, 1986. 
Weber, Max, 1914/1978, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978. 
Wolf, Susan, 1990, Freedom Within Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. 
————, 1981, “The Importance of Free Will”, Mind 90: 386-405. 
Zimmerman, Michael, 1988, An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Totowa, NJ: Roman 
and Littlefield. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
